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This paper presents a framework for investigating the intersection of collective action and 
gender; i.e. how gender-oriented analysis can foster more effective collective action in the 
context of agriculture and natural resource management and how collective action can be used as 
a vehicle for gender equity. We begin with definitions of the key concepts and then present three 
entry points for a gendered analysis of collective action-motivations, effectiveness, and impact 
on gender equity- vis-à-vis the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework 
(Oakerson 1992; Ostrom 1991). At the heart of this framework is the action arena, which is 
shaped by a host of initial conditions, including asset endowments, vulnerabilities, and legal and 
governance systems that influence a range of outcomes. Applying a gender lens to this 
framework, we present an analysis of how women and men experience the initial set of 
conditions differently and thus, have different motivations and capacities for engaging in 
collective action. Next, we look at how the gender composition of groups affects the 
effectiveness of collective action, and finally, at the impact of collective action on gender equity 
and women’s empowerment.  We conclude with a discussion of how this framework can 
improve our understanding of gender and collective action in order to facilitate more effective 
collective action while fostering gender equity. 
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It is notable that two of the last three Nobel Peace Prizes have been awarded to those who 
have worked to build local organizations that address poverty, environmental degradation and 
women’s well-being: Wangari Maathai of the Green Belt Movement in Kenya (2004) and 
Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (2006). Collective action plays a vital 
role in many aspects of human interaction, including income generation, risk reduction, and 
public service provision.  Experience has shown that institutions of collective action play an 
important role in how people use natural resources, which in turn shapes the outcomes of 
production systems. Many government devolution policies and community-driven development 
(CDD) programs are fundamentally premised upon collective action.   
Collective action refers both to the process by which voluntary institutions are created 
and maintained and to the groups that decide to act together. It can assume various forms ranging 
from voluntary self-help groups to formal organizations that aim to manage a community’s 
natural resources or to advocate for political change at the national or global level.  
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Integrating a gender perspective into applied research on collective action is imperative 
because institutions themselves are gendered and can either challenge or reinforce existing social 
roles. Gender also serves as an organizing principle for community action and thus may have 
implications for the efficiency and effectiveness of collective action.  In both the Green Belt 
movement and the Grameen Bank, for example, there is a clear gender dimension in their focus 
on fostering collective action by women.  But despite these types of well-known cases, there is 
insufficient empirical evidence and analysis regarding the role that gender relations play in 
collective action.   
This paper presents an analytical framework for investigating the intersection of 
collective action and gender; i.e. how gender-oriented analysis can foster more effective 
collective action and how collective action can be used as a vehicle for gender equity. We begin 
with definitions of key concepts and then present three entry points for a gendered analysis of 
collective action-motivations, effectiveness, and impact on gender equity- vis-à-vis the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Oakerson 1992; Ostrom 1991, Di 
Gregorio et al., forthcoming). At the heart of this framework is the action arena, which is shaped 
by a host of initial conditions, including asset endowments, vulnerabilities, and legal and 
governance systems that influence a range of outcomes. Applying a gender lens to this 
framework, we present an analysis of how women and men experience the initial set of 
conditions differently and thus, have different motivations and capacities for engaging in 
collective action, with particular reference to agriculture and natural resource management. Next, 
we look at how the gender composition of groups affects the effectiveness of collective action, 
and finally, at the impact of collective action on gender equity and women’s empowerment.  We 





collective action in order to facilitate more effective collective action while fostering gender 
equity. 
 




Collective action as an institution is commonly overlooked or, when recognized, 
frequently misunderstood. Most basically, collective action can be defined as voluntary action 
taken by a group to achieve common interests (Marshall 1998). The action can take place 
through an organization such as a producer cooperative or members can participate in such 
action directly. As a governance structure, collective action occurs not only when group 
members pool labor and resources to build a dam or well, for example, but also when a group 
establishes rules for resource use or non-use. While collective action can be complemented and 
strengthened by de jure law, its structure is often more determined by the customary law – with 
which members are most familiar – inherent in a community. It is important to note that 
collective action includes forming and enforcing rules for use (or non-use) of resources that 





Many researchers have tried to define the situations under which collective action occurs, 
and the characteristics that allow sustainable collective action (Baland and Platteau 1996; 1999; 
Ostrom 1992; 1999; Wade 1988). A review of these studies shows that the conditions for 
collective action are multiple and complex (see Agrawal 2001); however, collective action 





members’ socio-economic characteristics, they may recognize strong benefits in such collective 
projects as joint investment, maintaining local infrastructure, rule-setting for natural resource 
use, or representing the group to outsiders. Small group size, shared norms, previous successes in 
collective action (social capital), effective leadership, and interdependence among group 
members are factors that can encourage and support effective collective action (Agrawal 2001).  
Such factors are not limited to formal collective action, as in the form of cooperatives or 
other formal organizations. In fact, informal collective action can be more flexible and 
responsive to members’ shifting needs. In both forms of collective action, however, 
leadership/governance needs to be institutionalized, not dependent on one or two people, to be 
sustainable.
4 
Importance of collective action for natural resource management 
 
The characteristics of the resources around which collective action is organized also 
affect the group’s effectiveness and sustainability. In many ways, natural resource management 
(NRM) is a natural fit for collective action because it requires an expanded time horizon and 
spatial scale to be effective. Though some activities, such as the use of high-yield variety crops 
(HYVs), can be employed on a plot-by-plot basis and provide benefits within a season, most 
natural resource management technologies have ‘spill-over’ effects that require larger-scale 
action, and have benefits that accrue only after years and, sometimes, generations. For example, 
while pest management may be effective within a season, its use on only a few select plots can 
have negative consequences for adjoining plots to which pests may retreat. Watershed 
management exhibits a long-term time horizon, as well as the need for regional coordination to 
accrue benefits (Knox et al. 2002).  
                                                 
4 Some types of collective action are spontaneous or episodic, in response to particular needs or opportunities.  





Though most management programs for natural resources can benefit from collective 
action, well-defined boundaries and a limited scale facilitate effective collective management 
(Ostrom 1990 1992; Wade 1988). This may include a plot of forest reserved for common use to a 
certain community or coastline/fishery that is used exclusively by group members. The scale and 
excludability allows the group to regulate use, including prohibiting outsiders and enforcing 
sanctions on overuse by members. Collective action is also facilitated when the resource is 
located in or near the vicinity of group members and when all members exhibit a high level of 
dependence on the resource. 
Importance of collective action for other development activities  
 
Collective action and networks among community members can facilitate access to 
information.  Informal networks have always been important in dissemination of innovations, 
including new plant or animal varieties as well as new practices.  Formal group-based extension 
approaches have been adopted by many NGOs, as well as by large-scale government programs 
in Uganda and Kenya.  As in the case of natural resource management, collective action for 
research and extension does not always serve all farmers equally.  In particular, women farmers 
are often less likely to be served by extension services and female-headed households may be 
especially disadvantaged, whether due to male extension agents’ gender biases or because 
extension agents prefer to work with wealthier landowners, who often are male (Doss 1999).  
There remain important questions regarding whether group-based dissemination systems are 
more likely to serve women farmers.   
Although collective action offers an alternative to state and markets institutions, in 
practice it can also complement markets as well as government.  This can be particularly 





relations, or who may suffer from missing markets.  Examples include input and output 
marketing, agroprocessing, infrastructure development, labor markets, as well as credit and 
insurance. 
In many communities throughout the world, people work together to provide local goods 
and services they would not be able to provide as single individuals or that the government is not 
providing.  They build and maintain local parks, religious buildings and community halls, 
operate volunteer fire control groups, and implement rules for local natural resource 
management. Sometimes local groups share responsibilities for provision with local or central 
governments, such as in supporting schools and health services (McCarthy 2004).  In other cases, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a role in fostering the collective action, or use 
groups to disseminate information or services such as nutrition and health interventions, water 
supply and sanitation, infrastructure, and creating voice and capacity.  Many of these, along with 
microfinance and other natural resource management programs are considered as Community-
Driven Development (CDD) programs.  There are also numerous programs specifically targeted 
to women that are premised on collective action that have both economic and empowerment 
objectives. 
 
Benefits, limitations, and difficulties 
 
Collective action can provide significant benefits in reducing negative externalities in 
natural resource management, or in providing local public goods that address the needs and 
interests of its participating members. Where collective action has a strong basis in community 





enforcement comes from the group, monitors and other officials are more accountable and the 
cost of adjudication is often lower than in state-based programs. 
These benefits frequently translate into greater effectiveness of natural resource 
management or other local development programs. They can also have a positive impact on 
poverty and gender inequities, especially if collective action results in more equitable 
distribution of resources that can improve livelihoods for marginalized groups. In addition to 
improved resource distribution, collective action can also serve as a way for the poor to pool 
risks so that they can realize bigger benefits through long-term planning.  
However, collective action does not always reduce poverty or inequality.  A major 
limitation to collective action’s ability to meet community needs is the entrenched biases in 
community norms and expectations that disenfranchise certain categories of people. Women, the 
poor, religious or ethnic minorities may face significant constraints in their attempts to 
participate in collective action. They may not be able to participate at all (not accorded 
membership) or their participation may be only nominal or passive. Though needs and interests 
will align more within a single community, homogeneity among all members is an unrealistic 
expectation and may in fact result in less effective outcomes (e.g. adherence to rules) As such, 
collective action projects risk capture by elites that promote inequitable participation and benefit 
distribution. The result, then, is that collective action may benefit the already well-off, while 







Gender refers to the “socially determined ideas and practices of what it is to be female or 
male” (Reeves and Baden 2000).
5 These ideas and practices are sanctioned and reinforced by a 
host of cultural, political, and economic institutions, including the household, legal and 
governance structures, markets, and religion. While gender roles vary among cultures and over 
time, and are crosscut by a multitude of identities (e.g. ethnicity and class), the gender division of 
labor usually implies that men and women are relegated to the public and private spheres, 
respectively (Moser 1993; Agarwal 2000; 2001; Kabeer 1994; King and Mason 2001; Lind 
1997; Quisumbing 2003). Women are thought to be ‘natural’ caregivers and men ‘benevolent 
dictators’ who adequately supply material needs to their families (Bruce 1989; Moser 1993; Sen 
2000). This means that men undertake public activities, e.g. remunerative work and market 
activities, membership in formal community organizations, and participation in political 
institutions. Women’s activities, in turn, often are constrained to household and community 
management activities (childcare, food preparation, subsistence agriculture). Moser (1993) refers 
to women assuming a triple role, i.e. they are responsible for reproductive, productive, and 
community management activities, and receive little recognition for their unpaid work. Another 
way of broadly characterizing gender roles is that men take the lead in productive activities, and 
women in reproductive activities, where the latter include the reproduction of the family and 
even of society itself.   
The unitary view of the household suggests that in the gender division of labor, women 
and men’s roles and responsibilities are separate but complement one another. The accuracy of 
this model however, has been called into question by anthropologists for at least two decades and 
                                                 
5 Although ‘gender’ and ‘women’ are often used interchangeably, they are not one in the same. However, gendered 
analyses usually find that women are disproportionately disadvantaged, which is why the majority of gendered 





more recently by economists who find that gender is an important determinant of the distribution 
of rights, resources, and responsibilities within the household (Agarwal 1992; Alderman et al. 
1995; Haddad et al. 1997; Pryer 2003; Quisumbing 2003; Sen 1990). For example, Sen (1990) 
proposes a bargaining model of the household typified by ‘cooperative conflict.’ Household 
members cooperate so long as doing so improves their individual position. The extent of 
cooperation depends on members’ contributions to the household, access to asset endowments, 
and the consequent strength of their ‘fall-back’ position. One’s fall-back position also is based in 
part on the perception of each member’s contributions to the household (Agarwal 1997a; Moser 
1993; Sen 1990). Because women often undertake more reproductive (household management) 
tasks and fewer productive (wage-earning) tasks, they are commonly perceived as contributing 
less to household welfare than men. Finally, because of the social norms that restrict women’s 
sphere of activity, their access to additional human, social, natural, and financial capital is 
limited. Women’s negotiating power within the household is low compared to men’s and their 
reduced ability to negotiate further perpetuates gender inequality. 
While gender is a source of power differentials that shape women’s and men’s access to a 
range of resources, gender can also serve as an organizing principle for collective action; i.e. an 
identity around which women (or men) may organize in response to constraints within the 
household or the broader social environment. Defining gender as an organizing principle does 
not imply that women are a homogeneous group defined only by their gendered interests but 
rather that gender is one source of identity that women may mobilize around at local, national 





The Intersection of Gender and Collective Action: Three Entry Points 
 
As noted above, gender is both an organizing principle and a source of power dynamics. 
Yet, gender is largely absent from the literature on collective action for public goods provision, 
particularly in the context of agriculture and natural resource management.
6 While a considerable 
literature rooted in Women, Environment, and Development (WED) theory has debated whether 
women’s propensity to serve as local safeguards of the environment is linked to an intrinsic 
relationship to nature or their greater dependency on natural resources (see Jackson 1993a 1993b 
1998 and Westermann et al. 2005 for an overview) less systematic attention has been paid to 
gender as a source of group heterogeneity and its implications for effective collective action. The 
evidence that does exist suggests that the gender composition of groups is an important 
determinant of successful collective action for natural resource management. Meinzen-Dick and 
Zwarteveen (1998), for example, find that the involvement of women in water organizations in 
South Asia can strengthen the effectiveness of irrigation management. In their study of the NRM 
outcomes of 33 rural programs in 20 countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, Westermann et 
al. (2005) find that collaboration, solidarity and conflict resolution increase when women are 
members of the groups.  Similarly, in a study of 104 peasant cooperative institutions in Paraguay, 
Molinas (1998) finds that levels of cooperation increase with increases in women’s participation. 
Finally, Agarwal (2001) notes that women’s exclusion from community forest groups has 
efficiency implications and may exacerbate gender asymmetries in power relations.  
Finally, many women’s programs are premised on collective action yet lack a clear 
understanding of the mechanics of effective and sustainable collective action. The development 
literature is replete with examples of participatory development programs targeted to women’s 
                                                 
6 A review of five major references in this field (Agrawal 2001; Baland and Platteau 1996; Bromley 1992; Ostrom 
1990; Wade 1988) does not find gender or even women listed in the indexes.   





groups that fail to meet either their efficiency or empowerment goals because they did not 
adequately address how those groups are structured and managed (Baden 1999; Mayoux 1993 
1995a 1995b). Examples can also be found of externally-initiated women’s self-help groups that 
fail to address masculinities and men’s involvement in women’s groups, thus missing potential 
opportunities for transformative development processes (Cornwall 2000) vis-à-vis collective 
action. In Bangladesh, despite an NGO’s insistence that it would work only with women to 
create aquatic resource management committees, its efforts in a Muslim community failed to 
involve women in the long run because it lacked a clear understanding of local gender roles 
(Sultana and Thompson 2006). Inadequate gender analysis can also result in detrimental 
consequences for existing women’s groups. For example, an agroforestry extension project in 
western Kenya used women’s groups as entry points for the project.   Hambly Odame (2002) 
noted that men comprise a minority of membership in these women’s groups yet research on 
these groups tends to underestimate the importance of these gendered power dynamics in the 
distribution of resources and benefits.  The groups suffered a 67 percent rate of collapse over a 
12 year period, often resulting in a loss of labor, capital, and moral support for group members.    
Additional analysis is thus needed to address the question of how gender shapes women’s 
and men’s incentives and abilities to engage in, and benefit from, collective action on the one 
hand, and how different collective action institutions affect gender equity on the other. This web 
of interactions is complex but it also offers multiple entry points for analyzing the intersection of 
collective action and gender. This paper presents three such analytical entry points for doing so: 
motivations for engaging in collective action, effectiveness of collective action (as defined by the 





demonstrates that gender analysis can facilitate more effective collective action and collective 
action can be used as a vehicle for fostering gender equity. 
In terms of motivations, collective action programs are increasingly being used as a 
vehicle for reaching development and poverty-reduction goals; hence a better understanding of 
women’s and men’s motivations for joining such groups would help development practitioners 
assess whether their programs are hitting or missing the target. Evidence indicates, for example, 
that women have a higher opportunity cost of time than men which may reduce their incentives 
for participation (Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen 2003) so organizations that are able to tap into 
women’s motivations for participating in collective action may have a better chance of 
succeeding than those programs which assume that women and men share the same motivations. 
In addition, understanding the motivations behind groups that spontaneously form may help 
explain why some groups function better than others.  
In terms of effectiveness, certain socioeconomic characteristics, such as class and 
ethnicity, have been studied in an effort to understand the group dynamics and the power 
relations that foster effective collective action, but much less attention has been paid to how 
gender as a source of power relations influences group dynamics and patterns of interaction 
within collective action. This is somewhat surprising given that a wide range of group strategies 
exist (from women-only groups on one end of the spectrum, to gender blind male groups on the 
other, and mixed sex groups in between), thus raising the question of whether certain strategies 
may be more effective than others at realizing the group’s objectives.  
In terms of impact, collective action programs that fail to address gender, or that target 
women as beneficiaries without a clear understanding of gender relations within the given 





collective action can provide real opportunities to foster women’s empowerment, as can 
programs which do not regard gender equity as an end goal but see it as instrumental in reaching 
the group’s objectives. Thus, understanding the impacts of collective action on gender equity 
may provide insight into which strategy can best stimulate gender-equitable change processes at 
the micro, meso or macro levels.  
The Analytical Framework 
To explore the intersection of collective action and gender, we have adapted the 
conceptual framework for institutional analysis (Oakerson 1992; Ostrom 1991, 2005) that is used 
by CAPRi to investigate the relationship between institutions of property rights, collective action 
and poverty outcomes (Di Gregorio et al., forthcoming). This framework is especially suitable 
for analyzing collective action through a gender lens because it emphasizes the institutions, rules, 
and actors that create (gendered) patterns of interaction.
7 
In figure 1, the first box, the context or the external factors, represents the initial 
conditions that people face. It shapes the initial opportunity set of the possible actions, and 
includes the assets people have, the sources of vulnerability, and the relevant norms, legal 
structures and power relations. 
8 In the following section we will focus mainly on the constraints 







                                                 
7 The sections describing the framework are heavily drawing on Di Gregorio et al., forthcoming. 
8 In the original IAD framework which focuses on natural resource management, the key aspects of context that are 
highlighted are the physical/material conditions, the attributes of the community, and rules in use.  Di Gregorio et al. 










Source: adapted from Di Gregorio et al. (forthcoming) 
 
All of the external factors, as well as property rights and collective action, in turn, affect 
the action arena, the more dynamic section of the framework. This is where decisions are made 
and institutions are reconfirmed and reshaped. In other words, this is where social bargaining 
takes place. This framework can be applied at different levels depending on the subject and level 
of analysis: within households or within collective action groups, but also bargaining between 
groups or with the state, and other external actors. While the gender dimensions are often 
clearest at the intra-household level, it is relevant to examine the role of gender at each level. 
Nevertheless in the remainder of this paper, we focus primarily on the group level. 
These processes lead to patterns of interaction, for example the interaction within a 
collective action group we are analyzing. The focus here is on the rules and norms of the object 

























These activities (whether collective or individual) will lead to certain outcomes, which 
may or may not achieve the objectives the collective action group set out to achieve, but may 
also alter the initial conditions of the analyzed interaction or transaction. The former we will 
discuss under effectiveness, the latter under impacts. 
The Context or Initial Conditions 
 
To investigate the relationship between physical/technical and socioeconomic categories, 
we focus on asset endowments and vulnerabilities, as well as the basic institutional structure, i.e. 
the legal and governance systems that regulate and govern basic interactions among people. 
Particular attention is paid to the socioeconomic context—in which we subsume gender roles as 
they are defined in a given society—because  our analysis is concerned with how gender roles 
influence the extent to which women and men can use their asset endowments and the 
institutional infrastructure at their disposition. Put another way, while physical assets such as 
roads will enhance access to markets, a gender norm which confines women to their homes (e.g. 
purdah) will be a stronger determinant of women’s opportunities and constraints toward meeting 




Asset endowments are defined here as the pool of resources or assets available to an actor 
(Di Gregorio et al. forthcoming) and include physical, natural, financial, social, political, and 
human capital, as well as property rights vis-à-vis these assets. Property rights involve complex 
relationships between different uses and users of the resources and can only be effective if they 
are recognized as legitimate, which requires governance structures to enforce such rights. Rights 





bundles of rights. For example, a woman may have access to a piece of land for firewood 
collection but have no rights to plant trees on that land, as the latter activity is often reserved for 
those who own the land. Women’s property rights are important for agricultural productivity, 
women’s empowerment and household welfare. There is considerable empirical evidence 
indicating that property rights raise women’s status in the household as well as in the 
community, and this translates into greater bargaining power (Quisumbing 2003). For example, 
in a cross-site analysis in Sri Lanka, West Bengal and Kerala, Bhatla et al. (2006) find that 
women’s property ownership serves as a protective factor against domestic violence. 
A growing body of literature has documented gender disparities in asset endowments 
between female- and male-headed households and more recently, at the intrahousehold level of 
male-headed households (see Antonopoulos and Floro 2005 for a recent review of physical and 
financial assets). In terms of collective action, a prerequisite for participation is the possession of 
asset endowments valued by the group. A community’s wealthiest members may be able to opt 
out of collective action because their need to pool resources is very low while its poorest 
members are unable to participate because they lack sufficient resources, or endowments, (as 
defined by the group). For example, membership in many so-called “Water Users’ Associations” 
are restricted to heads of households with irrigated land in a designated area, although others also 
use water for domestic uses, small enterprises, livestock, gardens, etc. Thus, participation is 
usually greatest among those who possess a minimum level of assets or a skill set useful to a 
project (Agarwal 1997b; 2000; 2001; Johnson 2001; Weinberger and Jütting 2001). For the 
purposes of this paper, we are interested in examining how gender imbalances in asset 
endowments present constraints and opportunities for women’s and men’s participation in 






9 comprises the basic infrastructure and physical goods that support 
livelihoods, including affordable transport systems, water supply and sanitation, and access to 
information. Other components of physical capital include productive capital that enhances 
income (e.g. bicycles, rickshaws, sewing machines, telephones, agricultural equipment), 
household goods and utensils and personal consumption items such as radios and refrigerators. It 
is often assumed that men and women benefit equally from investments in infrastructure, yet 
women often stand to benefit less than men and may in fact become worse off as a result of 
infrastructure investments that do not consider the full range of their economic and social 
impacts (AusAid 1997). For example, although sex-disaggregated data on the use of ICTs are 
scarce, ICT technologies are not gender neutral and their use is often determined by existing 
power differentials within a society (Gurumurthy 2004), unless there are specific measures such 
as the Grameen Bank’s promotion of cellphone ownership by women.  Access to roads, 
transportation, and labor-saving devices can reduce the costs of participating in collective action, 
which is particularly important for women, who, as noted above, often have a high opportunity 
cost of their time.   
Financial capital is commonly defined as the financial resources that people use to 
achieve their livelihood objectives. These resources include available stocks, such as savings, 
and regular inflows of money, such as pensions and remittances.
10 While savings are the 
preferred type of financial capital of the poor, gender may influence women’s and men’s motives 
for saving, as well as the types of assets they prefer to save. For example, in Bangladesh, married 
women prefer not to save assets in the forms of large amounts of cash because their husbands are 
                                                 
9 The definitions of capital build upon the CAPRi glossary (http://www.capri.cgiar.org) and the IDS: Livelihood 
Guidance Sheet No. 8: Glossary, http://www.livelihoods.org/info/guidance_sheets_rtfs/sect8glo.rtf; Accessed on 
October 7, 2005. 
10 It should be noted that this definition is different from a strict economic definition of financial capital as it 





likely to take control of the money (Antonopoulos and Floro 2005). In other instances, single 
women prefer to save large sums of money to put toward their dowries (Deolalikar and Rao 
1998; Kim 1997) because assets brought to marriage are an important determinant of women’s 
future welfare (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2004).  These examples suggest that gender-based 
savings preferences may have implications for the types of groups that women prefer to join (e.g. 
rotating savings and credit associations). 
Natural capital is the term used for the natural resource stocks (e.g. trees, land, water, 
clean air, coastal resources) upon which people rely. The benefits of these stocks are both direct 
and indirect. For example, land and trees provide direct benefits by contributing to income and 
people’s sense of well-being. The stake that men and women have in natural resources will 
influence the extent to which they will take part in collective NRM activities.  For example, 
where men are in charge of livestock, they will have the greatest interest in pastures, but in areas 
where women have responsibility for caring for livestock, they are more likely to be involved in 
managing pastures or sources of fodder.   
While studies on human capital typically focus on the more obvious indicators of 
education, health, and nutrition, relatively less attention is paid to the ways in which actors 
perceive the world and themselves. Human capital will be addressed in greater detail in a later 
section of this paper. 
Social capital refers to the formal and informal social networks and relationships people 
draw upon in pursuit of their livelihood objectives. It can help women and men gain access to 
information, to influence or power, and to claims or obligations for support from others. Social 
capital can also serve as a building block for collective action. Yet, women and men tend to 





example, Maluccio et al. (2003) note that although women’s social capital networks are wider 
than men’s in South Africa, they also are more localized and mobilize fewer economic resources. 
This in turn, may have implications for whether men and women are equally able to draw upon 
their stocks of social capital to participate in collective action.  
Whereas social capital can be visualised as horizontal social organisation and solidarity 
within communities, political capital is the vertical link to policy and decision-making. Women’s 
relegation to the private sphere and their limited political representation suggest that women’s 
political capital may be weaker than men’s, although increases in the number of women in 




Opportunities to engage in collective action are determined not only by an individual’s 
asset endowments, but also by his/her vulnerability to economic, socio-political, and natural 
shocks, the degree to which differs by gender. A large body of literature has established that 
structural adjustment policies have adversely affected poor women because they have absorbed 
the economic shocks of adjustment by working longer and harder in both productive and 
reproductive sectors to compensate for state-cut social services (Gladwin 1991; Sparr 1994; 
Cagatay and Ozler 1995; Cagatay 1998). Women also often find it more difficult to bear shocks 
resulting from crises in agricultural production, such as drought, declines in landholding, or 
seasonal unemployment because they have less access than men to credit and employment in 
alternative labor markets (Adato and Feldman 2001). In the context of a burgeoning HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, widows are highly vulnerable to land grabbing after the death of their husbands, 
leaving them more economically vulnerable and thus susceptible to activities that put them at 





research from India indicates that women and girl children are often the first members of the 
household to suffer inadequate food intake in the face of seasonal food shortages as food is 
conserved for male members (Ramachandran 2004). 
In addition to the more obvious aspects of vulnerability, including a lack of financial and 
physical assets, women face certain vulnerabilities particular to their gender roles, which in turn, 
may affect their ability or willingness to engage in collective action. Such vulnerabilities include 
dependence on, or subordination by, male household members and in-laws, which may result in 
a husband’s refusal to allow his wife to engage in, or control the benefits accrued from, 
collective action. Likewise, gender-based violence (both within the home and at the community 
level) may impede a woman’s physical mobility to access groups if for example, she refrains 
from leaving her homestead due to the fear of harassment Indeed, security domains that 
encompass both domestic and state violence against women are increasingly being integrated 
into poverty analyses as research reveals that violence against women accounts for significant 
amounts of lost productivity and impedes overall economic growth (King and Mason 2001). 
 
Norms, Legal Structures, and Power Relations 
 
As noted previously, gender refers to the socially constructed norms that are shaped by, 
and embedded in, cultural, political, and economic institutions. These norms do not change 
overnight and in fact, attempts to directly challenge gendered norms and upset power imbalances 
may result in backlash and the further disempowerment of women. Thus, the conceptual 
framework presented in this paper can be used to identify strategic mechanisms to stimulate 
gender-equitable change.  
Legal structures are both shaped by, and reinforce, gendered norms. While changes in 





automatically translate into changes on the ground (i.e. changes in gendered norms) they do 
provide a basis for women’s appeals for more substantial rights. Decentralization can also help to 
change existing power structures by enhancing women’s participation in the public arena. It is 
often assumed that decentralization is inherently favorable to women because of its participatory 
nature, but as Baden (1999) argues, this is not always so and is contingent upon available 
resources and competition over these resources, the nature of local power structures, and the 
degree of organization and political visibility of women locally.  
Actors and their preferences 
 
Actors can be both individual and collective entities, including formal and informal 
organizations, the state, and NGOs. Although we have seen above that men or women do not 
constitute a homogenous mass, we may also treat mixed or single-sexed community groups as 
single actors.  
There is also a need to distinguish between internal or external actors. Internal actors are 
those who will have to follow the rules and regulations emerging from institutional bargaining, 
whereas external actors can influence the process, but are not bound by it or directly affected. 
For example, if an NGO sets up a self-help group, the members of the group would be internal 
and NGO staff external actors  
Another important category of actors is the change agent—those who can influence other 
actors and stimulate or facilitate social bargaining. Thus, it is strategic to identify change agents 
in a given context since they can help induce change. For example, Andujar (2005) found that 
women over 50 years of age were among those most active in the fight for drinking water and 





the tasks of reproduction and childcare and had a history of activism vis-à-vis the Catholic 
Church.  
To understand the motivations of actors, we have to understand their preferences. As we 
have highlighted in an earlier section, men’s and women’s preferences can differ quite 
substantially. For example, in terms of crop varieties, women’s preferences are often based on 
taste and cooking properties, whereas men’s are based on marketability. These gender-
differentiated preferences can have an effect on group formation (e.g. single-sexed vs. mixed 
groups), as well as on group effectiveness and gender equity. 
Action Resources 
 
Not all assets can be used by the actors as action resources in a given context. Action 
resources are those assets which are relevant to the specific situation, and increase the bargaining 
power of the actors. Whether a resource is useful depends on the nature of the interaction. For 
example, for decisions taken in public meetings, having the confidence to stand up and speak in 
front of the whole community can be an important action resource.  However, if women are 
forbidden from speaking in public this particular asset cannot be translated into an action 
resource. Siagian et al (2005) found that only one woman in a farmer’s group in Lubuk Kambing 
District, Indonesia was confident enough to seek support for the group’s objectives from district 
officials but because of her obligations as the local school teacher, she did not have the time to 
meet with them. 
All assets can become action resources. This includes the physical, financial, natural, 
social and political capitals as well as the human capital. As most of these have been discussed in 
an earlier section, we will focus here on human capital. Most analyses of human capital only use 





household, but rarely do they look at resources inherent in people. Other very important action 
resources include knowledge, social standing, networks, cognitive schemata (one’s way of 
thinking about the world), and time. For example, women (particularly poor women) often have 
a higher opportunity cost of time, as most of their time may be allocated to subsistence activities. 
Human capital thus refers not only to education and health but also the way the actors perceive 
the world and themselves.  
Information and the ability to process it 
 
Information is a power resource (Schlüter 2001; Theesfeld 2004), that allows those who 
posses it to change the perceived value of the different alternatives (Young 1995). Access to 
information is costly and spreads mainly through an actor’s networks and relationships. This 
suggests that it will play out differently for men and women since they accumulate different 
types of social capital. For example, Krishna (2003) found that where local agents had a good 
understanding of processes outside the locality, they were able to direct collective action toward 
development outcomes. Since men are more likely to have outside contacts, they are more likely 
to be able to direct collective action outcomes to their advantage. 
Cognitive schemata  
 
Cognitive schemata provide the limits of what actors perceive as feasible in their lives, 
and propose a guideline of how the world should be structured. Cognitive dissonance, the 
difference between mental models and the way the world works, affects how an actor thinks 
about and acts in actual events. Ideologies, as the vehicles of a shared idea of how the world 
should be, can play a crucial role in legitimizing group solidarity (Di Gregorio et al. 





For example, group members (sometimes including women themselves) may feel that 
women do not possess the knowledge or skills to effectively contribute to collective action. In 
community forestry programs in India and Nepal, Agarwal (2001) finds that women were 
perceived as having little to add in terms of forest conservation and frequently were not invited 
to group meetings. Likewise, community members – men and women - may feel that it is not 
women’s place to comment. Feeling intimidated by such a public event, women may sit in the 
back of the room or on the floor and simply observe (Agarwal 2001; Mosse 1995). Women who 
do speak up are often viewed negatively; their efforts to gain a voice in group projects are 
viewed as attempts to subvert gender roles. 
Women’s exclusion from participation may be a direct result of gender norms, or can 
emerge from other factors that are determined or exacerbated by such norms. In a study of 
mixed-sex agricultural cooperatives in Nicaragua, Mayoux found women’s participation limited 
to involvement as day laborers. When women attempted to make their voices heard or gain 
management positions, they were perceived by others (men and women) as attempting to step 
out of their appropriate social role.  
Social prestige 
 
The social "standing" within a society or group or vis-à-vis powerful actors (state, private 
entrepreneurs) can be an important action resource. Bourdieu and Accardo (1993) point to two 
sources for social standing: the habitus of an actor and the embeddedness of the actor in social 
networks. 
The habitus is often rooted in one’s way of thinking about the world, and is reflected in 
the way one speaks and acts.  This plays a major role in gaining leadership roles. Actors can be 





others.  Women’s savings groups around the world, for example, when successful, often increase 
the bargaining power and the confidence of women to engage in the public realm. Hence, social 
networks and the assets that an actor can derive from them depend on the ability of actors to call 
upon those social networks.  
In most societies, tangible assets also convey status.  The wealthiest households with 
most land occupy a higher place in many agrarian societies, while the landless may not even be 
considered full community members.  This has repercussions also for access to information and 
other collective resources.  In many agrarian societies, extension agents are more likely to visit 
wealthier landowners than landless tenants.  Even within the household, control over assets 
influences the bargaining power of individuals.  Fathers who control the household land may 
exercise authority over their sons.  Research has shown that women with control over assets have 
more decision-making power on intrahousehold decisions (Quisumbing 2003)  
Time 
A large body of literature has documented gender-biases in access to, and quality of, 
education and healthcare (King and Mason 2001; UNDP 1995; UN Department of Economics 
and Statistics 2005) but less work has explored the gendered-dimensions of time-use, particularly 
in the context of collective action. Yet women and men clearly have different time opportunity 
costs, and poor women in particular often have the highest opportunity costs of time since a large 
proportion of their day (and night) is allocated to subsistence activities; i.e. providing for their 
family’s daily food needs. Male household members may also force women to take responsibility 
for their tasks so that the men can participate in collective action groups. Because of this 
additional burden, not only are women more constrained to participate, but they may also call on 





impact schooling for girls and young women, reducing human capital stores for the next 
generation of women and, by extension, their ability to participate in group action.  
Hence, the opportunity costs of engaging in collective action on women’s time can be 
extremely high, particularly in labor-intensive collective action schemes. However, time 
constraints are not constant and may vary according to time of day and cultivation cycles, thus 
providing strategic points of entry to initiate collective action. Identifying more convenient 
meeting times and holding meeting near the houses to reduce travel time can help women 




Formal and informal rules determine how the initial conditions (norms, regulations, and 
laws) play out on the ground. They are the decision-making arrangements that affect which 
action resources are important.  For example, in the Bhavani basin, when water became scarce, a 
lawyer among the downstream farmers’ group used the courts to get an order for more water to 
be delivered to their area (Palanisami and Malaisami 2004).  But women from the upstream area 
appealed to their kinswomen downstream, who in turn appealed to the lawyer to withdraw the 
case.  In this example, the public fora favored legal knowledge as an action resource, but the 
women employed kinship and social pressure as action resources. 
Rules clarify expectations about the costs and benefits of participation. The rules shape 
the bargaining process and/or may be shaped in the process of bargaining. Rules can be written 
and unwritten, explicit or implicit. For example, in parts of northern Nigeria, women must 
observe seclusion under Shariah
11 law and thus cannot organize, but women have been able to 
                                                 





capitalize on the resurgence of Islam to form women-only associations that teach Islamic 
education. Through this informal rule that permits these schools, women are able to develop 
additional support networks to help with childcare and ceremonial expenses (Abdulwahid 2006).  
Which rules are part of the action arena, and which are seen as given in the context, 
depends on the subject and scale of analysis. If we are analyzing the group formation process of 
a particular Heifer project, for example, the rules and basic conditions set by Heifer are 
exogenous, as they are not subject to bargaining between the group members, whereas by-laws 
set by group will be endogenous, and thus part of the action arena.  
 
Motivations to Engage in Collective Action 
Women and men may vary greatly in their motivations and types of collective action they 
seek. Motivations are shaped by the preferences and interests of actors, as well as the way they 
perceive their chances of succeeding through collective action. The latter, in turn, relate to the 
rules and expected bargaining power of different groups.   
Preferences and interests 
 
The role of preferences and interests in affecting motivations links most significantly to 
the activities for which men and women are most commonly responsible. As a consequence, 
there may be significant overlap in types of participation: to improve resource access, income, or 
food security women and men both undertake collective action in the arenas of natural resources 
management (NRM), micro-credit, and production or market activities. However, Agarwal 
(1997b; 2000; 2001) suggests that men’s and women’s motivations can vary, even within the 
same group. Taking community forest groups as an example, she notes that the broad goal is 





patrolling to limit violations of rules governing use, as well as planting new trees to replenish 
dwindling forests. However, male group members, whose use of common forest resources is 
relatively limited, are motivated more by goals of increased income. Therefore, they promote 
strict controls (to encourage rapid regeneration) and replanting with eucalyptus trees, which are 
predominantly cash crops. Women, on the other hand, favor looser controls to ensure that they 
have access to fuel and other forest resources, and encourage planting trees with a greater use 
value for household tasks. Lind (1997) and Beard (2005) likewise argue that women become 
most involved in collective action linked to the gendered division of labor.  But other studies 
indicate that factors such as security and even non-economic returns (prestige, spiritual 
enrichment, or friendship) may also motivate group participation, and these factors may differ 
for men and women.  Abdulwahid (2006), Godquin and Quisumbing (2006) and Kariuki and 
Place (2005) show that there is considerable variability in motivations and group types, not only 
between men and women and between countries, but even between men and women in different 
ethnic groups within a limited area, highlighting the importance of cultural and contextual factors 
in shaping gender relations.   
Looking at the motivations of men and women is crucial to understand why certain 
groups are more effective than others and why certain processes lead to changes in the way 
women and men work together and understand each others roles. The following sections look at 
the factors that shape bargaining power and motivations of men and women and assess the link 
between the two concepts. 
Bargaining Power 
 
We define bargaining power as the ability of an actor to engage in social bargaining in a 





type of interaction or transaction and the rules determine which action resources an actor can use 
and how effectively they can be transformed into power endowments for the given situation.  
There are multiple levels of bargaining power (e.g. individual within household, 
individual within group, or group vis-à-vis the outside). The level of bargaining determines 
whom the actor is representing and thus, the identity he or she brings to the table. For example, 
in some African communities, a woman who speaks at public meetings is representing all 
women present at the meeting since socioeconomic norms dictate that women remain silent 
during public meetings. In other cases, a woman may remain silent in the presence of her 
husband during a public meeting even though she is more informed of the subject matter. This is 
a good example of women’s multiple identities coming into play and how they influence the 
bargaining power she is able to exert.  
Differences in actors’ fallback or exit options are an important source of bargaining 
power that determine the distribution of resources within a household or group. Exit options are 
determined in part by the actor’s ability to turn an asset into a power endowment in a given 
context. The actor with the better exit possibilities will be at an advantage in the bargaining. In 
the context of the household, this actor is usually male since the distribution of power and 
resources tends to almost always favor men (Quisumbing 2003).   
For example, a woman who has her own solar cooker can more easily exit a forestry user 
group than one who is dependent on that wood for her fuel, but this same cooker does not 
translate into a power endowment within the household. Assets brought to marriage and 
provisions of divorce and inheritance law will have more influence on exit options within the 





Women may participate in collective or group action as a response to constraints within 
the household and broader social environment. The emphasis on micro-credit is one such form of 
participation. Informal rotating credit schemes, chit funds, and institutionalized credit provide 
women with working capital, savings opportunities, and a way to subvert male control over 
household finances. However, if a borrower is unable to repay a loan or make payments into a 
fund, her bargaining power within the group may be jeopardized, to the point where she may be 
asked to leave the group. In Kenya some women’s groups maintain legal ownership of animals 
distributed to individual households, so that the group may remove them from homes where a 
husband treats his wife badly. This legal threat of removal can help decrease violence and 
divorce (Miller 2001). Thus, both the group and the asset strengthen women’s bargaining power. 
Another factor that will determine the actor’s power is his/her prior bargaining 
experiences because they alter the actor’s perceptions and expectations about the next bargaining 
process. Evaluating watershed management programs in India, Kerr (2002) found that where 
NGOs had been working with women and marginalized groups prior to the introduction of 
watershed management programs, these groups had greater capabilities to bargain for a better 
share of the benefits from the watershed programs.  Siagian et al. (2005) observed that groups 
whose members had successful and relevant past experiences were more confident they could 
achieve their group objectives whereas groups without such experiences were lost confidence 
more easily during the process. 
 
Motivations to engage in collective action 
 
The motivation of an actor is his or her willingness to engage in the bargaining process 
based on his/her preferences, action resources, and the rules, including barriers to participation. 





bargaining power of an actor. It is thus the power of an actor, or, more precisely the perception 
an actor has of his/her power, that influences actors’ motivations. Figure 2 shows the links 
between an actor’s preferences and resources, the rules governing an action situation, and his or 
her resulting bargaining power and motivation. 
 




In reaction to their own assessments of the probabilities of success, women may opt out 
and simply not participate, or they may create informal groups in order to meet their needs. In 
the community forestry example in Nepal, women who recognized the poor ability of all-male 
patrols to effectively guard forest resources created all-women’s patrols. Because of women’s 
reliance on forest resources, they are better attuned to spot violations (Sarin 1995). Further, due 
to social restrictions on interactions between men and women, women are more able to prevent 
female violators. Similar all-women activities have taken place in other contexts. In the 
agricultural cooperatives of Nicaragua, women have undertaken ‘consciousness-raising’ in the 
setting of an all-woman cooperative. In Bolivia, Cote d’Ivoire, and South Asia, women’s micro-
















sex group programs. All-women microfinance projects—and their informal counterpoint in 
revolving saving schemes or chit funds—allow women access to financial capital and increase 
control over their personal assets (Jhabvala and Bali 1990; Velasco and Marconi 2004). 
Collecting a critical mass of women with similar goals improves women’s ability to make their 
voices heard in participatory projects or allows them to operate projects targeted to meet the 
specific needs of women.  
The above arguments assume that women want to participate in group action, but 
Mayoux (1993; 1995a; 1995b) finds that women, especially poor women, are not interested in 
participating unless they see an obvious benefit. Because of their time and resource constraints, 
the value of institutionalized group action such as producer cooperatives often lie in its ability to 
increase real incomes. Mayoux gives the example of women in single-sex producer cooperatives 
in India. Though the development practitioners who initiated the program assumed women 
would be drawn to the ‘empowerment’ aspect of the cooperative (meaning they would all own 
and be responsible for management of the cooperative), Mayoux found that most women 
preferred piece-rate production, where they were not responsible for management decisions. 
Though this seems to contradict traditional development wisdom, women are often burdened 
with too much responsibility (albeit unrecognized) in the household, so they may seek more 
pragmatic ways to improve their livelihoods.  
In other instances, women may be reluctant to participate in collective action around 
issues traditionally perceived as male domain. For example, when the Self Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) initiated a collective action campaign in Gujurat, India to mobilize women 
for water management, women resisted participating because they regarded water infrastructure 





involvement in the water sector and some men even threatened not to work on water-harvesting 
structures that would be managed by women or to drink water from a structure built by women. 
Through interaction with SEWA, women gradually gained the confidence to participate in the 
campaign and be trained as handpump technicians. As the communities began to experience 
improved water supplies, men’s resistance to women’s involvement in the water sector 
diminished and some men began encouraging their wives to become members of the campaign. 
Thus, while the action resources and rules determine the bargaining power of the actors, 
both the perceived power and the preferences of men and women will determine their motivation 
to engage in collective action processes: whether they engage in social bargaining at all, or to 
adopt one strategy over another. 
These questions might be of help when trying to understand motivations and the way they 
influence group formation, functioning, and impact:  
  Do women and men have different preferences? 
  How do their asset endowments differ? 
  How does gender determine an actor’s ability to use his or her asset endowments?  
  What is the subject of the bargaining? 
  In what ways do the action resources represent opportunities or constraints to engage in social 
bargaining? 
  Do the rules strategically favor men vs. women? How?  
  How do women and men perceive the degree to which collective action will fit their 
preferences? 
  How can external institutions affect the bargaining position of the poor?   
 
In particular, this approach may help to identify whether there are ways to increase the 
bargaining power of disadvantaged groups by building up their critical action resources, or to 
shape the rules to build upon the resources that they do have, rather than those that they are 





instrumental in overcoming women’s own feelings of incompetence and inhibitions to speak up 
at meetings in Nepal, and this is likely to apply to other areas with a large gender gap in literacy, 
and where literacy has become an important indicator of an individual’s abilities to deal with the 
outside world. Increasing women’s experience with meetings in other types of organizations may 
also increase their confidence and ability to participate.   
 
Effectiveness of CA 
One major rationale for attention to gender in collective action institutions is that it can 
increase the effectiveness of programs.  A number of studies (Acharya and Gentle 2006; 
Agrawal et al. 2006; Barham 2006; Kariuki and Place 2005; Sultana and Thompson 2006) 
provide indications that the gender composition of groups is an important determinant of 
effective collective action, especially for natural resource management, but there has thus far 
been little systematic assessment of how, and under what conditions.  A more comprehensive 
assessment of this issue would provide valuable guidance to both local organizations and 
external programs.   
The first question to address is what criteria will be used to measure effectiveness. Will it 
be internal criteria—meeting the objectives that the group itself identifies—or externally-defined 
criteria, set by program funders, or by analysts who are looking for broader patterns that apply 
across different groups?  Both approaches are valid, depending on what the analysis will be used 
for, but it is essential to be clear about how the criteria are defined.  
A second critical question is whether effectiveness is measured over the short or long 
term.  Short-term results may be important for creating momentum in collective action, but 





Specific measures of the effectiveness of organizations might include tangible indicators 
such as the income or economic returns to group members, the distribution of costs and benefits, 
compliance with rules, or incidence and severity of conflicts.  Less tangible indicators might also 
be important to consider, such as satisfaction of being a member.  
How can gender affect the effectiveness of collective action institutions?  Critical areas to 
examine include the composition of groups, how the rules shape the ability of men and women to 
participate effectively, and the roles of men and women within the groups. 
 
Gender and participation 
 
We can broadly define two approaches to gender within many conventional collective 
action programs: gender-blind approaches and approaches to organizing all-female or all-male 
organizations.  Gender-blind approaches do not explicitly specify whether men or women will be 
members.  This is found in many NRM programs, such as irrigators’ associations or forest user 
groups that define membership as one person per household.  This frequently results in a 
predominance of male members, except from female-headed households, and even they may 
send a younger male member rather than a woman.  Reviewing the evidence on water users’ 
associations in South Asia, Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen (1998) found women’s participation 
to be much lower than that of men, despite high involvement of women in irrigated agriculture 
and agricultural decision making.  The few documented cases of a higher female involvement 
either stem from women-only organizations managing groundwater pumps or from areas where 
men were not interested or absent. 
Though there have been several typologies of participation, perhaps the earliest is Sherry 
Arnstein’s (1971) ‘ladder of citizen participation.’  In brief, this typology divides eight levels or 





The highest level of citizen participation is defined as ‘citizen control,’ in which citizen groups 
set and carry out their project agenda. More appropriate for the purposes of this paper is a 
typology articulated by Bina Agarwal (2001) in reference to community forestry programs in 
South Asia, in which participation ranges from nominal participation (membership in a group) to 
interactive participation in which a member ‘[has] voice and influence in the group’s decisions’ 
(1624). Rather than focus how a project is initiated, Agarwal argues that participation is best 
measured by members’ involvement and activeness in a project (see Table 2 below for complete 
typology). 
Table 2--Typology of Participation 
 
Form/level of participation  Characteristic features 
Nominal participation  Membership in the group 
Passive participation  Being informed of decisions ex post facto; or attending meetings 
and listening in on decision-making, without speaking up 
Consultative participation  Being asked an opinion in specific matters without guarantee of 
influencing decisions 
Activity-specific participation  Being asked to (or volunteering to) undertake specific tasks 
Active participation  Expressing opinions, whether or not solicited, or taking initiatives 
of other sorts 
Interactive (empowering) 
participation 
Having voice and influence in the group’s decisions 
Source: Agarwal (2001) 
 
The benefits men and women gain from group participation can also vary along gender 
lines. The level of participation has a strong influence on the benefits that individuals experience. 
When membership in a group is limited to one member per household, women may not even get 
the chance to participate. When they do, they can be limited to the lower levels of participation 
than men. Nominal, passive, and consultative participation are reflected in lower benefits from 





Time-use will also vary. Yet, this ‘time poverty’ is rarely considered in the way group 
meetings are scheduled. Though women may be interested in attending, they are overburdened 
with childcare, food preparation, and agricultural activities and therefore cannot fit group 
meetings into their schedules. 
That said, women are not a homogenous group, and may have greater or less ability to 
participate based on other socio-economic factors including income, ethnic group or caste, 
religion, and urban versus rural residence. The following section addresses directly the 
constraints to women’s full (interactive) participation, and the outcomes for efficiency, equity, 
and sustainability. 
 
Gender, participation, and effectiveness 
 
Theories of participatory management suggest that the lack of participation of a large 
number of the users of a resource would lead to performance weaknesses in the organization, 
because of weaknesses in communication, representation, democracy and accountability, which 
may lead to free riding, rent seeking and corruption (Ostrom 1992).  Zwarteveen and Neupane 
(1996) found that the all-male organization for the Chhattis Mauja system in Nepal faced 
difficulties in enforcing its rules on women.  Female heads of farms in the head end of the 
system always took more water than their entitlements, while contributing less labor than they 
should, but it was difficult to solve the problems because women were not members of the 
organization and could thus not be punished.  Women did not steal water or shirk from 
contributing labor to maintenance only because of opportunism.  Water stealing by women 
occurred partly because women had an interest in applying more water to the paddy-field to 
reduce their labor requirements for weeding, and rules and prevailing gender norms made it 





Many community forestry programs have also found that the rules determined by men are 
too restrictive and increase the time burden on women who gather firewood for household use; in 
other instances, these regulations force women to violate community rules in order to meet their 
needs. Women who observe regulations are also not directly rewarded for their adherence: If 
cash or in-kind payments are made, they are typically distributed on a household basis and go to 
male household heads. Men’s greater use of cash income toward leisure activities compared to 
women has been consistently documented in the literature (Bruce 1989; Quisumbing 2003; 
Smith et al. 2003). For forest management in Nepal, Sarin (1995) found that non-involvement of 
women made it easy for women (especially those from outside the village) to continue to gather 
firewood, in spite of strict regulatory rules set by the organization.  In some communities 90 
percent of the rule offenders were women.  Male office-bearers found it difficult to stop these 
women, since they risk being accused of molesting them.  As a result, the need for female 
participation in organizations is now accepted, but not on grounds of equity, participation or 
democracy, but because women are needed to help the organization enforce its rules, or to stop 
other women from taking firewood.   
Other positive examples are available from the Philippines. In the Mountain Province, 
because of women's roles in agricultural and household decision-making, especially with regard 
to cash flow, community organizers charged with organizing water users’ associations learned 
that unless women were encouraged to participate, the organizations could not be assured that 
the member households would pay their fees (Illo 1998). 
It should be noted however, that while involving both women and men in collective 
action can help a group attain its goals more easily, it does not necessarily lead to more effective 





(2006) describes the tribal community of the Kurichyas in Kerala, India which organizes 
collective action to manage traditional seed landraces around a pittan (headman) and his wife, 
who assume complementary roles in the monitoring, sanctioning, and exchange of seeds and 
their related knowledge. The pittan organizes official requests for seed from farmers outside of 
the community, while the pittan’s wife supervises the actual handling and storage of the seed. In 
her capacity as the guardian and custodian of women’s knowledge of genetic wealth, she 
organizes other women within the household to weave storage baskets for the seeds, maintains a 
storage system to diversify risk, selects the quantity and the quality of seed to enter the exchange 
network, and cleans the seeds in preparation for exchange. Although this division of labor leads 
to the effective exchange of seeds, it is only the male members of a household who are allowed 
to formally represent the household’s interest in acquiring seed. Similarly, in the western Kenyan 
highlands, the effectiveness of community water projects (measured by the successful operation 
of piped water supply) is attributed, in part, to a division of labor characterized by reciprocity 
and complementary roles. As principal users of domestic water, women report vandalism and 
breakages in pipes while men sanction rule-breakers and fix broken pipes. Yet, even though 
wives are instrumental in initiating and implementing the community water projects, they are not 
recognized as members of the formal project committees. Instead, they have formed their own 
groups to raise funds for the water projects and meet certain domestic needs (Were et al. 2006).  
Therefore, rather than gender-blind or single-sex organizations, a more nuanced, third 
approach, would be to try to develop mixed male and female organizations that allow for 
women’s full participation, particularly where men and women share joint interests or are both 
users of a resource (e.g. water).  However, this will not be easy.  Although the evidence on this to 





transaction cost because of the need to overcome gender barriers. The corollary of that is that the 
larger the degree of gender inequality, the higher the transaction costs will be. Thus, establishing 
mixed organizations is likely to be easier in societies in which women already have education 
levels on a par with men’s, and where women are used to going out and mingling with men, and 
much more difficult in societies which practice female seclusion, with low levels of female 
education.  Under such conditions, working with all-women’s groups to build capacity may be an 
important first step.   
Sultana and Thompson’s (2005) study of floodplain management in Bangladesh found 
that all-male community organizations took less time to establish than committees that included 
women (302 days vs. 340 days), but this was offset by a shorter time for the mixed organizations 
to start activities (179 days for all-male versus 106 days for mixed groups).  All-male groups 
were able to obtain and disburse more credit, and undertook more fisheries management 
activities, but also had more conflicts and more rule-breaking, suggesting that involvement of 
women in decision-making was instrumental for compliance and conflict resolution.
12  
A study on marketing performance of farmer groups in Tanzania (Barham 2006) shows 
similar results. Male-dominated groups showed comparatively more improvement in the 
marketing performance over time than mixed or female dominated groups. This can be explained 
by the obstacles faced by women to establish contacts with market actors such as agricultural 
companies or other chain actors looking for business who will more likely approach men.  
Acharya and Gentle’s (2006) study of the SAMARPAN (Strengthening the Role of 
Women and Civil Society in Democracy and Governance) in Nepal illustrates some of the 
complexities involved in building gender-balanced organizations.  The program provided 
                                                 
12 Interestingly, in detailed case studies, Sultana and Thompson found that an all-women’s group formed a men’s 





advocacy literacy training to women, but also engaged with local community group leaders.  
Community forestry user groups participating in this program showed an increase in women in 
leadership positions, who became active in auditing of group funds, expanding women’s 
membership, and influencing the group activities to include fodder and multiple use activities, 
biogas, and a range of activities to help very poor households.   The integration of a critical mass 
of women into the regular user groups led to better outcomes than all-women’s user groups, 
which lacked the support of men, and had smaller overall forest areas and less land per 
household than the mixed groups.  
Despite the higher transaction costs of establishing them, the examples above indicate 
that mixed groups can also have higher payoffs because they can tap into the differential 
strengths of men and women and also because they can get higher compliance with NRM, 
especially if men and women are both using the resource or have resources that are needed. 
Thus, evidence on the effectiveness of all-male, all-female, or mixed groups depends on whether 
it is assessed in the long or short-term. 
 
Key Questions on Effectiveness 
 
  How could gender analysis help make collective action more effective? 
  What stakes do men and women have in the outcomes of collective action?  
  What formal and informal roles do women and men play in the management of resource and of 
the group? 
  What action resources are critical? How are they distributed between men, women?  
  If funds are needed for the collective action, how much control of cash do men and women 
have within their households?   
  How do explicit and implicit rules affect ability of men, women to participate? 
  Are there enough men and women to create a “critical mass” within the organizations?   
  How does participation of men and women in decision-making affect compliance and 







Impact on Gender Relations 
Whereas effectiveness of collective action refers to the ability of groups to meet their 
immediate purposes (e.g. the management of a natural resource), impact of collective action 
refers to changes (in this case, changes in gender relations) that go beyond that. For example, a 
microcredit scheme designed to raise the income of its members would measure its effectiveness 
in terms of income earned while measurements of impact on gender relations would include the 
ability of women to control that income within the household.  
Measuring Impact 
 
Definitions and measurements of gender equity and women’s empowerment, like all 
social processes, remain contested but in essence, empowerment is the individual or group 
capacity to make self-informed and effective choices (Alsop 2005). The concept of women’s 
empowerment is best viewed along a continuum, ranging from emergence from isolation on one 
end of the continuum to participation in the public sphere on the other.
13 Thus, the criteria 
selected to measure impact will vary according to where along the continuum an actor is situated.  
If we look at our institutional analysis framework through a “gendered poverty lens”, we 
become interested in collective action outcomes in terms of all the critical aspects of poverty, as 
well as how these aspects are experienced differently by women and men. Impacts on gender 
equity can thus be evaluated by several indicators, including: the level and distribution of 
income, as well as the recognition that women may make tradeoffs, or tactical choices, between 
different material, psychological, and symbolic aspects of poverty (Chant 2003); the ability to 
                                                 
13 James-Sebro (2005) defines gender equality in four stages: engagement of women to come out of isolation; 
empowerment through acquired ideas, knowledge, skills, and resources; enhancement of lives in households and 





secure basic needs; the degree of social and political inclusion; security against violence 
(including violence against women); vulnerability to shocks; and more broadly, the opportunity 
set for livelihood improvement.  
 
Levels of Impact 
 
In this paper, we distinguish four levels of impact on gender relations: relations within 
the household, relations within the collective action group itself, relations of the group vis-à-vis 
the community, and relations of the community vis-à-vis the outside.  
Analysis of the impact of collective action on gender equity cannot be divorced from 
analysis of the household because activities undertaken as a collective feed back into women’s 
and men’s social bargaining within the household. For example, income-generating collective 
action schemes may increase a woman’s fallback or exit options within the household if she is 
able to strengthen her asset endowments (e.g. financial capital) and draw upon them as action 
resources to increase her bargaining power within the household. A study of the impact of group-
based fish pond or vegetable technology programs in Bangladesh found that women who 
participated had significantly higher empowerment levels on such criteria as keeping control 
over money, and reduced domestic violence (Hallman et al. forthcoming).   
At the community level, collective action groups, particularly mixed-sex groups, may 
alter perceptions of women’s socioeconomic contributions, thereby increasing their status within 
the community. In the same Bangladesh programs, the group-based fish ponds changed the 
gendered division of work because, although men were involved at various stages, negotiation 
over the activities and output took place above the household—men had to negotiate with groups 





Collective action groups may also mobilize enough social and political capital to contest 
the state. A well-known example is the Chipko movement in India, which began as a group of 
women literally embracing trees to prevent against deforestation in their community, spread 
across the state, and resulted in a major victory in 1980 with a 15-year ban on green felling in the 
Himalayan forests of Uttar Pradesh. The Green Belt Movement in Kenya similarly grew into a 
significant political force. In Argentina, Anduja (2005) found that women’s ability to secure 
clean water for Villa Jardin rendered them “indisputable interlocuters” with institutions outside 
of their neighborhood. Collective lobbying efforts have also been influential in strengthening 
women’s legal rights and share of state expenditure at the national level, e.g. in Uganda, 
Tanzania, and South Africa.  Even at the international level, the global women’s movement may 
be seen as a form of collective action that has had an impact on development discourse and 
policy, such as through the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform for Action. 
 
Feedback Loops 
As the above examples suggest, changes in gender relations may feed back into the action 
arena, the initial conditions, or both (see Figure 1). Panda (2006) observes, for example, that 
women who participated in the Self Employed Women’s Association’s (SEWA) water campaign 
grew more confident to participate in the public domain as a collective and thus challenged 
(male) alcohol consumption at both the village and household levels, resulting in decreased 
alcoholism in some villages. Applying the analytical framework to this example reveals that 
impacts on gender equity were observed in both the action arena (women’s increased 





discussed in an earlier section of this paper, whether impacts on gender relations feed back into 
the initial context or the action arena of depends on the subject and scale of analysis.   
Alternatively, collective action may have negative impacts on women’s empowerment if 
collective action programs are designed “gender-blind” or with false assumptions regarding 
women’s motivations for joining a given group. For example, Arganosa-Matienzo (2005) notes 
that women who engaged in collective soap production faced additional time constraints due to 
the high labor inputs required for soap making while also earning less than they did as paid farm 
laborers. Clearly then, collective action can be used as a vehicle for women’s empowerment, but 
it can also contribute to women’s disempowerment.   
 
STRATEGIES FOR EMPOWERMENT 
 
Given the complexity of gendered norms and roles and their variances across cultures, 
there is no “one-size-fits-all” collective action strategy for fostering gender equity. In some 
instances, particularly where there are deeply entrenched levels of gender inequity, women-only 
groups may be more effective strategies for bringing women out of isolation, fostering their self-
confidence, and building their capacity to bargain within the household. In other instances, 
mixed-sex groups may be more effective vehicles for enabling women to build their asset base 
and negotiate in the public arena.  
Therefore, if we conceive of women’s empowerment along a continuum, as suggested 
above, mixed-sex groups that respond to both women’s and men’s needs may be more 
appropriate the further along the continuum women are situated. Such groups may also affect 





greater recognition by men for both their paid and unpaid contributions to the community, 
although clearly this hypothesis warrants further investigation.  
Another factor for external organizations to consider is how to integrate gender issues 
into collective action groups.  In some contexts, groups that explicitly address gender equity as 
an end-goal may have a greater impact on women’s empowerment whereas in other contexts, 
groups that address gender issues only in terms of the obstacles and constraints they present for 
realizing the group’s (non-gender-related) objective may have a greater impact.  
 
Key Questions on Impact: 
  What types of impact can be observed? How can these be measured? Are they always 
empowering, and to whom? 
  Which factors within the initial context and action arena facilitate or hinder impact on gender 
equity? 
  How can (poor) women and men increase their ability to bargain? Through collective action? 
  What are some strategies for using collective action to stimulate gender-equitable change 
processes (e.g. increasing women’s action resources, changing the rule set)?  





This paper has presented an adapted version of the Institutional Analysis Development 
framework to investigate the intersection of gender and collective action. The framework has 
applicability to research and practice.   
For research and analysis, this framework can help clarify linkages we observe in the 
world by conceptualizing gender as both a source of power asymmetries and as an organizing 
principle.  The first part of the framework is useful for identifying key aspects of the 





and women.  The second part helps to go “inside the black box” of collective action, to look at 
the various action resources that different actors have to draw upon, and how the rules affect the 
bargaining power of different actors, especially men and women.  There are often gender 
differences in the action resources that people draw upon in the action arena.  For example, men 
often have more land and financial resources.  In societies where women have less education and 
are discouraged from speaking in public, they will be at a disadvantage if collective decisions are 
made in public debates.  Even the rules are often gendered, as when only the “head of 
household” is considered a member of the decision-making bodies.  By recognizing these 
factors, the framework thus provides a dynamic way of analyzing collective action through a 
gender lens: institutions + rules + actors create gendered patterns of interaction, which in turn 
affect the effectiveness of collective action.  These outcomes of collective action, in turn, can 
have a broader impact, changing the initial conditions, particularly gender roles.   
What value does this framework provide for strengthening gender and collective action 
programs? First, it can help external organizations to: (1) learn from, and strengthen, informal 
forms of collective action that women (and poor women, in particular) may engage in, and (2) 
identify mechanisms for organizing gender-responsive formal types of effective collective 
action.  
In particular, the analytical framework can help us understand the action resources 
women and men require in order to participate in collective action. This, in turn, can be used to 
redress power imbalances by building up the critical action resources so that both can participate 
effectively.  For example, if financial resources are critical, microfinance targeted at women can 
be instrumental; if habitus, especially the ability to speak in public is critical, then training 





to identify the rules that hinder or foster an actor’s ability to translate his or her assets into action 
resources, e.g. by looking at how decision-making favors one set of assets over another. 
Identifying the motivations of men and women is a prerequisite for building effective collective 
action which needs to take into account the costs and benefits of men’s and women’s 
participation. These costs and benefits are shaped by the preferences that people bring to the 
activity, as well as the definition of roles and rules within collective action groups.  
As evidence mounts that reducing poverty and increasing gender equity are 
fundamentally related objectives, external actors—whether government agencies, NGOs, or 
others—can support gender equity by increasing the action resources available to the 
disadvantaged, such as by strengthening tangible or intangible resources and capabilities that are 
critical for bargaining power.    Identifying rules that build upon the assets that women possess 
(rather than upon those they tend to lack) provides another means to increase equitable collective 
action. Additional evidence on the contributions of gender-balanced participation in collective 
action on the effectiveness of organizations can help to justify investments in going beyond 
gender-blind programs, or even beyond single-sex organizations.   
The evidence is still fragmentary, but there are indications that organizations that include 
men and women may be more difficult to establish, but can be more effective, especially in 
managing natural resources, when both women and men are users of the resource.  However, 
there are also times when gender disparities or cultural barriers to men and women working 
together are so great that it is important to work with women’s groups to build their capacity.  
There remain important questions of whether external agents can be more effective at fostering 
gender equity by manipulating the action arena as opposed to contesting against the initial 





Although poor women and men may be able to influence change in institutions 
underlying collective action (both organizations and social institutions) in their favor, their lower 
level of action resources makes such outcomes more difficult to achieve.  External change agents 
can assist in such processes, but the complexity of both gender and institutional change means 
that favorable outcomes are not automatic, even if external agents are genuinely interested in 
reducing poverty and fostering gender equity.  Indeed, because gender roles change in response 
to shifting economic, political, and cultural forces, roles within groups are subject to change as 
well. These changes may create additional opportunities for women’s full-scale participation or, 
alternatively, they may lead to an erosion of women’s status. Thus understanding how to 
influence collective action institutions merits serious attention as part of both poverty reduction 
and gender-equity strategies. We hope that this framework will provide a systematic basis for 
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